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#### ROSENMAN & COLIN

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NEW JERSEY OFFICE ONE GATEWAY CENTER SUITE 2600 NEWARK, N.J. 07102 201-645-0572 SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN (1896-1973) RALPH F. COLIN (1900-1965)

March 20, 1995

RECEIVED

FEDERAL COMPONING SECRETARY

William F. Caton, Acting Secretary
Federal Communications Commission
Room 222
1919 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20554

DOCKET FILE COPY ORIGINAL

Re: Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers

Ex Parte CC Docket No. 94-1

Dear Mr. Caton:

The attached letter was sent today to Kathleen M.H. Wallman, Chief of the Common Carrier Bureau. The letter provides additional support for a continuation of the existing price cap plan for elective companies. Copies were also sent to each of the Commissioner's offices.

I am filing two copies of this response pursuant to the requirements of Section 1.1206(a)(1) of the Commission's Rules.

Very truly yours,

Robert A. Mazer

No. of Copies rec'ts
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

OFFICE OF SECRETARY

Ms. Kathleen Wallman Chief, Common Carrier Bureau Federal Communications Commission 1919 M Street, N.W. Room 500 Washington, D.C. 20054

Dear Ms. Wallman:

Re: CC Docket 94-1

Lincoln Telephone Company ("Lincoln"), by counsel, is submitting this letter to supplement the record with regard to the Commission's proposals to modify its price cap regulations described in the above-captioned proceeding.

In the Second Report and Order in the Price Cap Proceeding (CC Docket 87-313, 5 FCC Rcd 6786 (1990) at para. 103), the Commission recognized that smaller companies may not be able to sustain productivity improvements equal to that of the largest local companies and therefore made price cap regulation optional for smaller firms. Four companies elected price cap regulation on the terms and parameters of that Order. Lincoln elected price cap regulation with the annual tariff filing that was effective on July 1, 1993. Lincoln was the last company, to this date, to elect price cap regulation and has been subject to that form of regulation for less than seven quarters. It made its decision to elect price cap regulation based on the existing price cap plan. The information outlined below demonstrates the need by companies such as Lincoln for continuation of this plan. Lincoln believes that if changes are made to the plan, that affect its risk under the plan, it will be forced to reconsider its initial election. This would not be in the interest of Lincoln or its subscribers.

Lincoln Will Not Be Capable Of Sustaining The Same Productivity Gains As The Larger Local Companies Over The Long Run

Lincoln is 1/70 the size of a mandatory company (Exhibit A).

- From the late 1970s to present, Lincoln adjusted downward its labor force by 32%. Further reductions will become asymptotic very quickly and are limited by scale and scope (Exhibit B).
- Lincoln has already engaged in significant network and operational centralization. Lincoln completed its digital switched conversion in 1992 and 100% of Lincoln's interoffice routes are fiber optic (Exhibits C1-C5).

## Modification Of The Current Price Cap Plan Will Limit Lincoln's Ability to Fund It's Ten year Broadband Plan

- Lincoln's management has approved a plan to build a broadband network that is expected to cost \$200 million. This would increase annual capital requirements by approximately 60%. Relative to larger companies, this represents a significantly greater risk due to the limited size and diversity of the Lincoln market.
  - Undue constraints on video dial-tone and other interstate prices erodes Lincoln's ability to implement these plans.

## Lincoln Will Be More Vulnerable To Competition And Therefore Competition Will Reduce Productivity At A Faster Rate Than For Larger Local Companies

- Lincoln has only <u>one</u> urban area (Lancaster County, Nebraska) over which to spread competitive risks.
- This one county, Lancaster, out of the 22 counties serviced by Lincoln represents 61% of Lincoln's revenue (Exhibit D).
- One of Lincoln's 137 wire centers accounts for 30% of its interstate access revenue (Exhibit E).
- Lincoln receives most of its revenue from very few customers (Exhibit F) (i.e., 25% of Lincoln's end-user revenues are generated by less than 1000 customers.)
- · Competitive options <u>currently</u> available to major IXCs in <u>one</u> wire center could reduce Lincoln's interstate access revenue by 12% (Exhibit G).

Ms. Kathleen Wallman March 20, 1995 Page 4

In conclusion, Lincoln believes that, changing the plan that Lincoln elected would be inappropriate at this time and any conclusions based on Lincoln's short experience period would be premature. Moreover, Lincoln believes that unitary productivity hurdles are not appropriate for all price cap LECs because of fundamental differences in markets and costs. The Commission can, however, design a price cap plan that does provide the proper incentives for efficiency and investment for a broad range of local companies.

Very truly yours,

Robert A. Mazer

cc: Chairman Reed E. Hundt
Commissioner James H. Quello
Commissioner Andrew C. Barrett
Commissioner Susan Ness
Commissioner Rachelle Chong

## EXHIBIT A

## COMPARISON OF SIZE Lincoln vs. Mandataory Companies

	1993		
	Operating		
	Revenues		
Lincoln	150, 185, 888		
Ameritech	10,127,000,000		
Bell Atlantic	11,258,632,000		
BellSouth	12,928,866,000		
GTE	12,569,128,000		
NYNEX	11,399,833,000		
Pacific	9,244,000,000		
Southwestern	8,153,486,759		
US West	8,655,900,000		
Average Mandatory	10,542,105,720		
Percentage	1.42%		
Size	1/70		

Source: USTA Phone Facts 1994




EXHIBIT C1

LINCOLN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH SWITCHING ENTITIES AS OF 1980




EXHIBIT C2

# LINCOLN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH SWITCHING ENTITIES AS OF 1995





Exhibit C3



Year	Lincoln	Territory	Total
1974	335	116	483
1975	311	107	449
1976	302	107	450
1977	321	106	467
1970	338	112	472
1970	355	112	487
1980	339	101	450
1981	310	93	421
1962	279	89	385
1965	257	69	342
1984	226	26	200
1986		25	231
1900	210	0	210
1967	7 184		184
1900			170
1986			158
1900			150
1901			100
1902			106
190			162
1904	l 150	1	150






Exhibit D
Total Revenue by MSA & Non-MSA



NON-MSA

MSA



Values will not add to 100% because 15th & M data is a subset of Zone 1




Exhibit G

## ESTIMATED COMPETITIVE REVENUE LOSS with collocation in one wire center

SCENARIO 1

SCENARIO 2

	1993 Base Period	Percent Subject to	Estimated	Percent Subject to	Estimated
Service Category	Revenues	-	Revenue Loss	•	Revenue Loss
Common Line	\$11,783,848	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0
	7227.007020		***	••••	• •
Traffic Sensitive	\$8,730,609	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0
Interconnection	\$4,929,772	0.00%	\$0	37.96%	\$1,871,276
Tandem Switched	\$2,240,427	26.25%	\$588,177	26.25%	\$588,177
Voice Grade	\$1,065,960	27.18%	\$289,702	27.18%	\$289,702
Audio	\$10,630	44.01%	\$4,678	44.01%	\$4,678
DDS	\$251,180	36.70%	\$92,181	36.70%	\$92,181
DS1	\$2,074,277	39.25%	\$814,068	39,25%	\$814,068
Misc	\$53 <b>,538</b>	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0
IX	\$32,364	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0
Total Price Cap Revenue	\$31,172,605	5.74%	\$1,788,805	11.74%	\$3,660,081

Scenario 1 - Assumes that the 80% of the tandem switching charge remains in the interconnection charge.

Scenario 2 - Assumes that the 80% of the tandem switching charge currently in the interconnection charges is reallocated and become subject to competition.